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Ethnocentrism in Present Germany:
Some Correlations with Social Integration and
Subjective Assessments
by Michael Terwey
Zusammenfassung:
Arbeiten von Durkheim über Religion und soziale Integration werden als ein Ansatz für
die Analyse von Ethnozentrismus in Deutschland verwendet. Dementsprechend ist eine
relativ weite, funktionale Definition des Religiösen einzusetzen. Jede Religion enthält Ele-
mente, welche den engeren Kreis offensichtlich religiöser Institutionen überschreiten. Ak-
tive Integration in soziale Gruppen und Identifikation mit ihren Idealen beeinflussen stark
die Identitätsfindungen und Einstellungen von Individuen. Die nachfolgenden empirischen
Untersuchungen versuchen, Antworten auf verschiedene Fragen zu geben. Sind die unter-
schiedlichen Stärken von Ethnozentrismus, die sich zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland
feststellen lassen, in Verbindung zu sehen mit den stark differierenden Graden kirchlicher
Bindung? Inwieweit stehen politische Linksorientierungen in Verbindung mit der Akzep-
tanz von Minoritäten? Sind es subjektive ökonomische Unzufriedenheiten, welche das ge-
genwärtige Ausmaß der ethnischen Intoleranz allgemein bestimmen? Zusätzliche Aufmerk-
samkeit gilt den "Postmaterialisten", deren Wunschhaltungen auch eine Prioritätssetzung
auf die "multikulturelle Gesellschaft" beinhalten mag. Einige Untersuchungsergebnisse
deuten auf eine besondere Bedeutung vager Befürchtungen und sozialer Pessimismen für
die unterschiedliche Ausbreitung von Ethnozentrismus hin.
Abstract:
The work of Durkheim about social integration and elementary forms of religious life is
taken as a major starting point for the analysis of ethnocentrism in Germany. His func-
tional conception of the religious is not narrowly oriented as in some theories of contem-
porary sociologists. Every religion contains parts by which it overlaps the circle of obvi-
ously religious institutions. Active integration into social groups and identification with
their special ideals shape identities and attitudes of individual men. Our empirical investi-
gations deal with several questions. Are the differences in ethnocentrism which we find for
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East- and West Germany explained by differing attachments to Christian churches? To
what extent do left-wing ideologies foster tolerance in the New Federal States? Do subjec-
tive economic wants account for contemporary ethnocentrism in post-unification Ger-
many? Additional attention should be paid to the 'postmaterialists', whose aspirations may
include a priority on the establishment of a 'multicultural society'. Some empirical results
suggest the importance of vague anxieties and social pessimism for differing strength of
ethnocentric attitudes.
Introduction
For more than a thousand years political affairs were closely connected with Christian ide-
ology and organization. According to Durkheim (1960), 'God' with somewhat changing
traits has served as society hypostasized. A religious importance of such kind may also be
attached to the integrating concept of a Nation or 'Volk' (people), but there is no essential
sociological difference assumed between an assembly of Christians celebrating biblical
events or Jews remembering their Exodus from Egypt and a reunion of citizens commemo-
rating a cherished goodness in their national past (Durkheim 1960). In spite of all 'secu-
larisation', there seems to be a lasting need of a positive ideological 'intégrisme' (cf.
amongst others Martin 1978) combined with some kind of 'transcendences' in the differ-
entiated sense of Luckmann (1995).
Social relationships are to a large extent constituent for our perception or even construction
of reality (Berger and Luckmann 1974). Many Christians, for instance, imagine or con-
ceive the existence of a God, who is really communicating with men and the existence of a
positive community in parish or church. Joining in such a concordant community and at-
taching respective meanings to the ceremonies in church already exalts beyond the ordi-
nary life. The real event of a somewhat transpersonal communication in practiced church
seems to prove to a certain extent that there is true meaning in Christian belief and fellow-
ship. Hence, experiences of solitude, interindividual alienation, hostility and meaningless-
ness may be expected to be less constituent for the 'Weltanschauung' of Christians in
communities than for unchurched people who have not established a functional equivalent.
Some kind of 'fait social' or 'Society' in the almost sacral sense of Durkheim (1960) is
proven (cf. also Firsching 1995). Communal religious practices evolving around more or
less portentous 'transcendences' (Luckmann 1995) are suitable for achieving an in-group
identification, a positive social identity and an individual self-conception.
A sociological conceptualization of religion, social integration and supplementing world-
views related to economy or moral principles is further exemplified by the following quo-
tation: ‘Man's characteristic privilege is that the bond he accepts is not physical but moral;
that is, social. ... the source of the crisis is an abrupt growth of power and wealth. Then,
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truly as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs were
regulated can no longer remain the same. ... The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be
immediately improvised. ... Since the relations between various parts of society are neces-
sarily modified, the ideas expressing these relations must change. ... Wealth, on the other
hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend on ourselves
only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility of un-
limited success against them ... Not without reason, therefore, have so many religions
dwelt on the advantages and moral value of poverty. It is actually the best school for
teaching self-restraint. ... From top to bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused without
knowing where to find ultimate foothold. ... A thirst arises for novelties, unfamiliar pleas-
ures, nameless sensations, all of which loose their savor once known. Henceforth one has
no strength to endure the least reverse.’ (Durkheim 1951: 252 - 256)
Nevertheless, a combination and maximizing of various subjective, personal demands in
the sense of 'Wertesynthese' (synthesis of values; cf. Gille 1994) may of course endorse
many positive ideals. One of the challenging ideals could be a positively integrated, multi-
cultural society, where social security, tolerance, hospitality and the protection of various
human rights are guaranteed, while the costs ought to be candidly covered by transfers
from security spending, higher taxes for the upper milieus or some other 'skilled' politics.
Ethnocentrism: An intergroup differentiation shaping identification
The basic importance of Christian ideology has been clearly shown by European and
American history. Accordingly, it has also been demonstrated, if not to say even overrated,
by important sociologists as Durkheim (1951), Weber (1993) and Tönnies (1979; cf. also
Greeley 1995a). As already introduced above, there are some momentous worldviews
which are not explicitly attached to a formal church. Union movement, Marxist parties and
National Socialism are important examples for organizations proclaiming worldviews
which are in some respects similar to traditional religions. An extreme, but very simple
example is shown by the quotation of Adolf Hitler in Glock and Stark (1966: XV): 'I be-
lieve that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending
myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord.'
In a 'post-modern' period of assumed individualization non-material or material prefer-
ences could be dissociated from larger obvious ideologies, but to a certain extent socializ-
ing may not succeed without a larger communal reinforcement. In general, we have still to
consider individual traits and social group-attachments as constituents of personal identity
- and moreover, we have to muse on the intergroup dimension as a medium of externally
rooted 'identification'. A basic understanding of social reality is often established by differ-
entiating between an in-group and various out-groups (cf. Tajfel 1982; Wasmer et al.
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1996). A simple interpretation of the social identity theory of Tajfel and others could be
attached to a nation, a special people (unser Volk) or a church which would be contrasted
to various out-groups. The social identity theory proposes that social categorization is em-
ployed by individuals not only to systematize and make sense of a complex outer world but
also to make sense of oneself. Accordingly, self-concepts are built on both personal identi-
ties, who we believe to be as embodied individuals and on an assumed social identity, the
groups with which we align or disconnect ourselves. Group (non-) allegiances assist in
defining, to ourselves and to others, who we are in terms of our social connections. There
are some similarities between the concept of in-group in the sense of social identity theory
and the concept of (religious) community proposed by Durkheim, but the latter is more
often used with positive connotations as 'society' is assumed to be basically sound (cf. the
concept of 'anomie' introduced below).
The most extensive in-group of Germany is originally constituted by the German national-
ity of the parents or at least one of the parents (ius sanguinis), not by the place of birth as in
some other countries. Note, that present out-groups do not necessarily have to be foreign-
ers and that many people who today are testified Germans have formerly immigrated into
the German area. Social problems as rising costs for social services may be attributed to
some criticized parts inside the nation (e.g. Germans who shun legal work) or to out-
grouped ethnics and migrants, as it is still done today. More or less negatively privileged
groups whose members often have a German citizenship could be Jews, Roma, Sinti, 'aus-
siedler'1 or members of certain religious sects and political groups. The definition of an in-
group may not be considered as a vague expression of pride and self-esteem, but also as a
means of restriction intended to cope with moral or economic problems. A very important
example with religious, ethnic and economical connotations is the historical role of Jews,
who were held responsible for numerous social and even physical problems.
Today, statements about foreigners are increasingly connected with economic assertions
about asylum, social welfare, unemployment, national labor market competition, global-
ization and criminal violence (Velling 1994; Mochmann and Oedegaard 1995; Albrecht
1997; Heitmeyer 1997).2 Diverse impressions about immigrants may be improved or even
deteriorated by direct contact. With some groups among the foreigners such contacts can
be easier established than with others (e.g. contacts at work cannot be made with ethnics
that have yet not entered the labor force), but media reports and political declarations could
                                                
1 'Aussiedler' are ethnic Germans being descendants of German farmers and craftspeople who had moved to
Eastern Europe in former centuries and came back to Germany after the Second World War.
2 In May 1998 14% of respondents (Politbarometer) named foreigners and asylum as one of the two most
important political topics in Germany. The immigration issue has moved into second place, surpassed only
by the topic of unemployment (85% of respondents thus designate unemployment as such an especially im-
portant issue; Politbarometer 05/98).
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counteract personal positive experiences with guest workers, foreign students and other
agreeable 'auslander'. It may be brought to notice again that in recent years the nationalities
and the motives of immigrants have significantly changed; accordingly the former desig-
nation of 'guest workers' (Gastarbeiter) has become more and more untoward for immi-
grants in general (Velling 1994; Rudolph 1996; Blank and Schwarzer 1994; Blank and
Wasmer 1996).
Labor market competition and special identification with an ethnic majority group are
probably connected. Therefore, negative economic assessments shall be analysed as sub-
jective background for competition-based ethnocentrism (cf. McCutcheon 1998). Accord-
ing to these competition-based theories the highest levels of hostility are supposed to occur
among majority group-members in the lower strata of social inequality. Following Korn-
hauser (1959) and McCutcheon (1998), mass society-based theories of ethnocentrism
could yield alternative explanations for deviating results. In a low-tension mass society
membership in smaller communal groups can protect individuals from taking over extreme
ideologies. This may be particularly true, if these communities are characterized by toler-
ant norms of social conduct. In such liberal or compassionate communities we could as-
sume a positive effect of group-integration, with slight reference to Christian tenets or hu-
manist ethics. On the other hand, many communal groups may foster a more restrictive and
less tolerant conception of various outsiders (cf. the discussion of social identity theory
above and the idea of ‘Gemeinschaft’ as used by Tönnies).
Some survey items about the acceptance of foreigners in Germany
Originally, the term 'guest worker' was used to refer to foreign laborers who had since
1955 been recruited from certain countries in Southern Europe and North Africa (cf.
Thränhardt 1988; Velling 1994; Kühnel and Terwey 1994). For some time, guest workers
almost determined the public image of 'foreigners' in West Germany. In contrast to smaller
numbers of other immigrants from the Northwest or Central Europe they were often per-
ceived as apparently foreign, and they made up the vast majority of all immigrants till the
mid 80s.
The guest workers of the 60s and early 70s were practically invited to immigrate, because
there was a shortage of labor supply. They had politically unlimited admission to enter the
German labor force and hence the guest workers were having an extremely high employ-
ment rate. Later, images about 'foreigners' in Germany were modified due to new sub-
groups of migrants. Many of the recent foreign migrants are not 'invited guests' who assist
in overcoming a shortage of labor supply, but they are unemployed and somehow un-
wanted refugees dependent on social welfare assistance. The migrants from Eastern Europe
as well as the asylum seekers from Asia and Africa are primarily to be mentioned in this
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respect. Even though views about 'guest workers' from the time of recruitment after 1955
remained important factors in featuring the public opinion about immigrants, these new
streams of immigration nurtured new identifications for out-groups from abroad. Moreo-
ver, the immigrants in the early 90s contrast with previous ones by their higher heteroge-
neity (Velling 1994). East Germans and 'aussiedler', East European labor migrants, asylum
seekers and civil war refugees from various places compete with the major former migrant
groups. The new quality of immigrants from far abroad also influences their position in the
present labor market which is not in a very favorable condition anyway. Whereas accord-
ing to ius sanguinis 'aussiedler' as ethnic Germans have not been subject to any legal labor
market restrictions at all, other migrant groups have been confronted with severe obstacles
to find a job.
There is a list of so-called 'guest worker'-items in ALLBUS. These questions are among
those ALLBUS-items which have been used for research most frequently (e.g. Krauth and
Porst 1984; Gehring and Böltken 1985; Blank and Schwarzer 1994; Blank and Wasmer
1996; Kühnel and Terwey 1990, 1994; Terwey 1989). In the following analyses, primarily
four of these guest worker items are used as indicators of ethnocentrism (cf. ZA and
ZUMA 1996, 1997):
(1) Guest workers (after 1994 Split 2: foreigners living in Germany) should adapt their
life style a little better to that of Germans (ADAPTION)
(2) Guest workers (after 1994 Split 2: foreigners living in Germany) should be sent
back home when there is a shortage of jobs in Germany. (REMIGRATION)
(3) Guest workers (after 1994 Split 2: foreigners living in Germany) should be forbid-
den to participate in any political activities. (NO POLITICS)
(4) Guest workers (after 1994 Split 2: foreigners living in Germany) should choose
their marriage partners among their countrymen. (ENDOGAMY)3
Answers were classified on a seven-point scale: 1. Don't agree at all...7. Agree completely.
Moreover, there are four other items dealing with different types of personal contacts with
guest workers or foreigners living in Germany. These contact items will later be used in
analysis.
                                                
3 (1) Gastarbeiter (ab 1994 Split 2: die in Deutschland lebenden Ausländer) sollten ihren Lebensstil ein
bißchen besser an den der Deutschen anpassen.
(2) Wenn Arbeitsplätze knapp werden, sollte man die Gastarbeiter (ab 1994 Split 2: die in Deutschland
lebenden Ausländer) wieder in ihre Heimat zurückschicken.
(3) Man sollte Gastarbeitern (ab 1994 Split 2: den in Deutschland lebenden Ausländern) jede politische
Betätigung in Deutschland untersagen.
(4) Gastarbeiter (ab 1994 Split 2: Die in Deutschland lebenden Ausländer) sollten sich ihre Ehepartner
unter ihren eigenen Landsleuten auswählen. (cf. ZA and ZUMA 1997)
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Growing ethnocentrism in West Germany?
Many political discussions and media-reports have pointed out a growing salience of the
immigration issues and a restrengthening of ethnocentrism in present Germany. In the af-
termath of economic recession, globalization, worldwide migration and abdication of the
socialist regime, several ethnic and even religious conflicts may possibly become more
portentous. Muslims appear to be important candidates for out-groupings in a world
viewed as sliding into a 'clash of civilizations', where religious and ethnic differences do
visibly coincide. In spite of all, a lot of German media coverage, declarations by church
officials and many political statements are still aimed at promoting further integration.
The increasing share of foreign residents in Germany since the 'economic miracle'
(Wirtschaftswunder) in the 60s has to be recognized as an important demographic change
(cf. Rudolph 1996; Fassmann and Münz 1996), which has influenced certain areas more
than others. Some selected data from the Federal Bureau of Statistics (Statistisches Bun-
desamt 1997) may illustrate this:
- In West Germany the proportion of foreigners has risen considerably from 1.2% in
1961 to 10.2% in 1995 (1989: 7.7%)
- In post-socialist East Germany the shares of foreigners remained at notably lower
levels of 1.2% in 1989 and about 1.7% in 1995
- In urban areas, the proportion of foreigners is much higher (e.g., Frankfurt (1994):
29.2%, Mannheim 21.1%, Cologne: 19.4%, Hamburg: 15.4%, Berlin: 12.6%)
- All in all, compared to other West European countries Germany has an especially
high percentage of foreign residents (about 40% of all foreigners in 10 West Euro-
pean countries live in Germany followed by France with about 21%; Fassmann
and Münz 1996: 39). This high share of foreign residents may be in part attributed
to legal obstacles of civil integration (ius sanguinis).
According to the Statistisches Bundesamt (1997: 40) most foreigners came to the former
Bundesrepublik (BRD) in search of employment. This seemed to be appropriate in a pros-
pering post-war economy. In the 'Wirtschaftswunder' some connections between the eth-
nic, nationalist or religious out-groupings and economic issues seemed to lose priority. The
guest workers were often considered to do hard jobs thought to be undesirable for Ger-
mans.
As far as our four items for ethnocentrism are concerned, the relationships between the
four series remain similar since 1980 (cf. Chart 1). All four indicators show decreases of
ethnocentric statements in West Germany until 1994. Considering media coverage and
political discussions on that topic, this result seems somewhat surprising. A probably
dwindling proportion of the German population may have caused a strong impression of
xenophobia by dramatic articulations of hostility(cf. Leenen 1995).
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However, from 1994 till 1996 the ethnocentric intolerance amongst ALLBUS respondents
becomes more frequent again.4 The 'softer' the indicator, the more it seems to yield a rising
tendency of criticism towards immigrants:
- ENDOGAMY has been supported the least and thus stands for a fairly strict kind of
exclusion. The rise from 1994 to 1996 is only two percentage points (18% vs.
20%).
- Since 1984 the demand for REMIGRATION in case of scarce jobs  with regard to
frequency follows right after endogamy in second place (1994: 22%, 1996: 25%).
- Prohibiting political activities of foreigners has been supported with similar fre-
quencies till 1990. After that NO POLITICS seems to take a slightly different trend
than ENDOGAMY and REMIGRATION. More demand for control of political ac-
tivities may have been caused by some striking actions of small radical groups in
Germany (1994: 32%, 1996: 36%).
- Most frequent, however, is the demand for ADAPTATION of life-style as can be
seen from Chart 1. The recent increase from 49% to 59% in this somehow soft indi-
cator of ethnocentrism is particularly obvious, but wishing such adaptation may
also express some kind of readiness to integrate foreigners under certain conditions.
                                                
4 A slightly increasing intolerance of foreigners can also be seen in a time series of another German survey,
the 'Politbarometer' (ZA-Nr. 2391).
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CHART 1: Support for ADAPTATION, REMIGRATION, NO POLITICS,
and ENDOGAMY with regard to foreigners or guest workers
West German respondents (5 - 7 in a 7-point-scale (ALLBUS 1980 - 1996))
West: ADAPTATION West: REMIGRATION
West: NO POLITICS West: ENDOGAMY
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A basic comparison of ethnocentrism in East and West Germany
Compared to the Old Federal States, Eastern Germany shows at least a similar increase in
ethnocentrism from 1994 to 1996.5 However, the overall level of ethnocentric inclinations
is even higher in East Germany though fewer foreigners do really dwell there (cf. Chart 2).
Ethnocentrism does not necessarily have to correlate with the number of foreigners living
in a country. A small out-group which is viewed as unwelcome, or even a reference group
that is hardly present at all, can attract a lot of aversion or serve as an aim for negativity
caused by social problems in a transforming society. Particularly, the demand for
remigration, when the labor market is tight, has increased strongly from 30% to 41% in the
New Federal States. We may presume that in an economic situation often perceived as
falling below a proper standard the criticism of outlandish minorities is an outlet of nega-
tive feelings. This finding may be seen as some kind of support for competition-based
theories of ethnocentrism (cf. additional results in: McCutcheon 1998). But on the other
hand, a constructive ideology providing positive values for integration in the sense of
Durkheim may also be lacking. We shall see later that in ALLBUS 1996 some direct
evaluations of individual deprivation do not perform as well in detailed analyses of ethno-
centrism as it could have been expected ex ante.
                                                
5 For 1994 only the survey split that used the wording 'foreigners' has been included in the East-West com-
parison shown in Chart 2.
West: ADAPTATION
East: ADAPTATION
West: REMIGRATION
East: REMIGRATION
West: NO POLITICS
East: NO POLITICS
West: ENDOGAMY
East: ENDOGAMY
0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 %
1994
1996
CHART 2: Support of ADAPTATION, REMIGRATION, NO
POLITICS, and ENDOGAMY with regard to foreigners in Germany
West and East German Respondents (5 - 7 in a 7-point-scale (ALLBUS 1994, 1996))
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Notwithstanding some singularities of meaning and measurement, all four indicators can
be reduced into one single principal component or factor by exploratory analysis. This is a
pretty stable result for each year of measurement (cf. also a comparison of confirmatory
factor analysis and latent class analysis in: Kühnel and Terwey 1990). The average scores
of a principal component analysis (PCA) across all ALLBUS-data available are shown in
Chart 3. Again, the resulting latent variable discloses an increasing acceptance of foreign-
ers up to 1994 and a decline after that. However, the average in 1996 indicates still less
ethnocentrism than in 1980, when our measurements were started.
After introducing our basic indicators of ethnocentrism and the latent common component
extracted to reduce some of the complexities, we shall proceed with a brief outline of
structural differentiations which we expect to be related with ethnocentrism.
Secularization, social disintegration and enlightenment: The case of Germany
Youth in search of positive and negative self-identification is often in the vanguard of so-
cial change. Younger people lean towards convictions which they regard as progressive.
Since the late 60s, especially the better educated parts of the younger generation have
stressed human rights and a continuing enlightenment which ought to free us more and
more from uncomprehended traditional forces, which have been considered to be repres-
sive.
Positive sign means higher average acceptance of foreigners or guest workers
1980 82 84 86 88 90 91 92 94 96
0
0,2
0,4
-0,2
-0,4
CHART 3: Ethnocentrism (ETHNOCENT) in Germany since 1980
(average PCA-Scores for ADAPTATION, REMIGRATION,
NO POLITICS, ENDOGAMY combined)
East and West German respondents (ALLBUS 1980 - 1996)
West: ETHNOCENT East: ETHNOCENT
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Today, traditional churches in Germany are still confronted with a severe loss of members.
This withdrawal from traditional organizations proclaiming a Christian worldview is espe-
cially significant among young and better-educated people. A lowering percentage of chur-
ched people in the general population may be seen as an important indicator of a trend to-
wards increasing secularization in Western Europe. The question is open, whether secu-
larized Europeans replace Christian attitudes by morals which are even closer attached to
those human rights protecting outsider minorities or ethnic groups.
Christian adherence was frequently correlated with the acceptance of traditional values in
society (Durkheim 1951; Inglehart 1998; Pappi and Terwey 1982). Yet today, churches
seem to display a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards the acceptance of liberal human
rights. First, there is a large part of conservative church members, who may be more alien-
ated towards immigrants than the more secularized parts of the population. They could
even claim some of the ethnocentric parts in the Old Testament as a foundation. Secondly,
some Christian representatives play an important role in the public declaring their care for
disadvantaged 'neighbors' in this world (cf. the concept of a tolerant community introduced
above). The latter position may presently be seen as more corresponding to the command-
ments of Jesus Christ and his apostles than crusading attitudes and parts of the Old Testa-
ment. At first sight, the prevalent general teaching of church in Germany has changed from
more rigid and intimidating aspects towards expressions of hope and charity (Ebertz 1993;
Greeley 1995; Terwey 1993). Such differing attitudes within churches may be correlating
with simple demographic disparities. Actually, the older Christians are often expected to be
more conservative and ethnically oriented than the younger ones, and we formulate an ex-
pectation for members in the bigger German churches (Volkskirchen): Controlling for age,
Christians organized in the predominant churches should be more tolerant of ethnic mi-
norities than non-Christians.6
Anyway, another determinant of ethnic tolerance has to be considered in this context. The
effects of secularization as decreasing influence of mainstream-churches would be leading
to less liberal ethnic orientations, if they are not counteracted by the main-force of enlight-
enment, i.e. rational education. If maximizing of subjective demands is based on sound
material security, it may be expected to have a special stronghold among people with
higher credentials and in the superior white collar milieu, which is on average materially
rather secure and well-equipped (Pappi and Terwey 1982). Educational attainment or certi-
fied human capital is somehow a meritocratic backbone in the white-collar hierarchy and
                                                
6 A striking feature is the extraordinarily high degree of unchurched people in Eastern Germany. This result is
unparalleled in many other ex-socialist countries for which we have survey data (cf. Greeley 1995; Terwey
1998). If our optimistic expectations about reduced ethnocentrism amongst church members are appropriate,
the radical secularisation in the former GDR could explain much about the important role that ethnocentrism
plays in the New Federal States.
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for various reasons also in the milieu of self-employed (cf. Terwey 1987). There is an im-
portant interplay of social class and education in several respects, which is expected to go
beyond the sphere of obvious pecuniary inequality. On the other hand, formal education
conveys also individual culture, erudition or 'Bildung' in the sense of German 'Neuhuma-
nismus' and rational enlightenment. Both components of education may result in rational-
istic substitutes for traditional Christian persuasions (cf. Meulemann 1985, 1996). Modern
education is overtly not turning people to some kind of heathenish transcendentalism and
the component of Christian teaching in school is apparently not dominant. We can clearly
begin to see the need for a multivariate model as a check for some crossing effects: People
with higher education prove true to the ethics of liberal enlightenment and shun ethnocen-
tric prejudice.
Table 1 provides us with introductory information about relations between church attach-
ment and ethnocentrism while controlling for some relevant socio-demographic differ-
ences. An initial impression of aggregate differences between East and West Germany has
already been given by Chart 2 and 3, but now we can also see how much individual data
variation is explainable at the individual level. The multiple classification analysis (MCA)
shows a moderate bivariate effect of eta=.11 which is slightly reduced by the control of
other variables also listed in Table 1 (beta=.09). On average the New Federal States deviate
.22 or .18 respectively from the Grand Mean (.00) towards higher ethnocentrism.7
Corresponding to our expectations, we recognise that age of the respondents (eta=.36,
beta=.28) is in fact a very important correlate of differential ethnocentrism. Older people
are considerably more reluctant about foreigners in Germany. Our assumptions are also
definitely confirmed as far as the role of higher education is concerned. The impact of edu-
cation (eta=.41, beta=.24) is similarly strong as the estimated age-effect. Besides, people
living in places of larger community size (i.e. administrative community size) tend to be
moderately less ethnocentric (eta=.16, beta=.09).
Differential objective welfare position is indicated by social milieus in Table 1 which can
be constituted by direct or indirect relation to the occupational system (cf. Geiger 1967;
Terwey 1987; 1990).8 Expectations are confirmed that people in the rather secure and ma-
terially well provided milieu of the upper white collars are much less ethnocentric than the
farmers and the lower blue collars. A rather high bivariate effect of eta=.29 is substantially
reduced by the statistical controls (beta=.12) as levels of education and community size are
                                                
7 A gender variable is omitted in Table 1. There is no relevant gender difference as far as this kind of ethno-
centrism is concerned.
8 Incomes of the respondents and of their households were also tested as measurements of material welfare.
Both types of income showed significant bivariate effects. However, the multivariate impacts proved to be
comparatively small.
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Table 1: Multiple Classification Analysis for demographic predictors of ethnocentrism
factor (ALLBUS 1996, results weighted to adjust the Eastern oversample;
positive signs mean higher ethnocentrism)
n
Unadjusted
deviation     eta
Adjusted for
independents
deviation      beta
Part of Germany
 1 Old Federal States 2454 -,06 -,05
 2 New Federal States   640  ,22  ,18
,11 ,09
Age
1 18-29 years of age   548 -,44 -,35
2 30-44 years   949 -,27 -,20
3 45-59 years   845  ,12  ,10
 4 60 years or more   751  ,53  ,39
,36 ,28
Education
 1 Primary education   287  ,72  ,43
 2 Primary & vocational 1203  ,28  ,14
 3 Medium Education   901 -,13 -,05
 4 Higher Education   339 -,53 -,26
 5 University, college   364 -,66 -,44
,41 ,24
Community Size
 1 Less 2000 inhabitants   239  ,32  ,19
 2 2000-4999   325  ,18  ,05
 3 5000-19999   739  ,10  ,07
 4 20000-49999   525 -,02 -,02
 5 50000-99999   256 -,05 -,08
 6 100000-499999   618 -,12 -,04
 7 Over 499999   392 -,28 -,14
,16 ,09
Social Milieu
 1 Farmers     62  ,58  ,14
 2 Small self-employed   115 -,28 -,12
 3 Employers   140 -,19 -,06
 4 Upper white collar   672 -,42 -,19
 5 Lower white collar 1014 -,01  ,01
 6 Upper blue collar   155  ,12 -,02
 7 Lower blue collar   937  ,33  ,14
,29 ,12
Denomination
 1 Protestants, EKD 1216  ,02 -,01
 2 Other Protestants     36  ,37  ,03
 3 Catholics 1016  ,02  ,04
 4 Other religions     45 -,23 -,08
 5 No church at all   781 -,07 -,03
,06 ,03
Church Attendance
 1 Several times a month 496 ,13 -,02
 2 Several times a year 583  ,00  -,01
 3 Less often  1039  -,02 ,01
 4 Never  975 -,04 ,00
,06 ,01
Multiple R  =  ,505
to a certain degree accentuated in these milieus. Nevertheless, the impacts of more or less
well provided milieus support competition-based explanations of ethnocentrism.
Subsequently, it can be realized from Table 1 that the denominational groups inside of
Christian churches are a little more ethnocentric than the formally unchurched people. Less
tolerance is at first sight especially shown by members of 'evangelische Freikirchen'
('Other Protestants') outside of the Lutheran mainstream (Evangelische Kirche Deutsch-
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lands (EKD)). This group of conservative 'Freikirchen' is, however, only pretty small. At
least the bivariate description of church attendance in unified Germany seems to reveal a
systematic pattern, but this globally observed pattern is in contrast to the expectations of
enhanced tolerance in the active church-communities. Moreover, the effects of Christian
denomination and church attendance tend to vanish in the multivariate part of the analysis
in Table 1. These findings will be tested again by several multiple regression in order to
see whether the minor effects now shown may disappear completely or may become
stronger again. First, we shall turn to another introductory overview of secular and political
assessments.
Perceptions of economic situations, anomia and diffuse political support
The subjective evaluation of economic conditions is expected to be one of the most im-
portant reasons behind many other conceptions, attitudes and preferences. Note, that ac-
cording to the rather conservative view of Durkheim (1951) economic dissatisfaction or
greed may result in an anomic worldview, which is partly not rooted in material poverty,
but in the stimulation of wishes that can never be completely satisfied (cf. the quotation at
the beginning of our text). The aspirations in economically caused anomia exceed legiti-
mate boundaries and impede the livability of individuals or human society.
It has already been indicated that economic dissatisfaction, envies and fears are spreading
again in unified Germany up to 1996. In particular, the evaluation of Germany's overall
economic situation deteriorated dramatically after a very positive state around 1990. At
first sight, Eastern and Western Germany are even very similar in this respect – a phe-
nomenon that would deserve more attention in future analysis. A first step in this direction
is a comparison between the assessments of the German economy and of the respondents'
own economic situation. These do frequently diverge.
(a) The evaluation of the general situation is a rather volatile opinion on social policy in
general. It expresses diffuse political unease, which must not correspond to a real
economic scarcity.
(b) The evaluation of the respondent’s own economical situation is generally more stable
and frequently connected to the objectively measurable welfare of the respondents
(cf. Terwey 1990, 1997).
Either because of diffuse economical fears or because of subjective material deprivation
the acceptance of ethnic strangers may be low. The most important example in German
history may be found in the period of the worldwide economic crisis at the end of the 20s,
which facilitated the expansion of National Socialist ideology and an anti-Semitic conspir-
acy theory (cf. Popper 1974: 123). All in all, our expectations are: Negative assessments of
the general economic situation in Germany are positively related with ethnocentrism. For
different reasons, similar expectation may also be appropriate for the effects of the as-
sessments of personal economic situations.
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It has already been shown by empirical analyses that several attitudinal trends in Germany
have changed since 1990 (e.g. Terwey 1995, 1996, 1997). In the course of far reaching
societal transformations, previously valid social ideals and habits (nomos) loose influence
on the individuals (Durkheim 1951, 1960), and a state occurs which lacks effective and
positively accepted rules for living. Primarily with regard to society, these insecurities
about social norms have been referred to as 'anomie'. This concept is used with a conser-
vative meaning. Usually, a positive preeminence of social tradition and integration is as-
sumed, which is often beyond the scope of individual intellects and wants. Those individu-
als who positively accept their given society tend towards 'eunomia' (Srole 1956). It may
be easily understood that a fundamental characteristic of such eunomia is a general social
optimism and social attachment. Other individuals who feel that important cultural goals
are devalued in society or that there are no more legal means to reach these goals probably
come to a pessimistic interpretation of their contemporary society. These people tend to-
wards individual 'anomia' (Srole 1956; Merton 1970; Friedrichs 1997).
If there is some kind of lasting dissatisfaction about society which cannot be traced to easy
causes and the solution of the problems appears to be difficult, we all may tend to look for
some scapegoat to put the blame on. Racist organizations could provide people in loss of
appropriate community with a pseudo-communal surrogate. Therefore, we may expect a
positive link between anomia and opposition against some social minorities (cf. Srole
1956; Heitmeyer 1997).
We examine anomia as some kind of social pessimism about future and interpersonal
commitment using four items from ALLBUS (ZA and ZUMA 1997):
1. No matter what some people say, the situation of common people is not getting better,
but worse (WORSE SITUATION).
2. It is hardly fair to bring children into the world with way things look for the future
(NO CHILDREN).
3. Most politicians are not at all interested in the problems of common people
(CARELESS POLITICIANS)
4. Most people do not really care, what happens to their fellow men
(CARELESS MAJORITY).9
                                                
9 (1) Egal, was manche Leute sagen: Die Situation der einfachen Leute wird nicht besser, sondern schlechter.
(2) So wie die Zukunft aussieht, kann man es kaum noch verantworten, Kinder auf die Welt zu bringen.
(3) Die meisten Politiker interessieren sich in Wirklichkeit gar nicht für die Probleme der einfachen Leute.
(4) Die meisten Leute kümmern sich in Wirklichkeit gar nicht darum, was mit ihren Mitmenschen geschieht.
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Chart 4 shows recently growing percentages of people who agree with the indicator NO
CHILDREN as an example of recent changes in anomia. We may add that NO CHIL-
DREN is the statement which attracts least consent among the four ALLBUS-indicators
and reveals, hence, a deeper kind of discouragement. Comparing different years in Chart 4,
this profound pessimism seems to be a little bit less frequent in 1991, but spreads after-
wards especially in East Germany. On the other hand, the percentages of persons who de-
scribe the general economic situation in Germany as bad have grown even more since
1991. Both outlooks seem to covariate only moderately with each other, as far as it can be
derived from the aggregated percentages in Chart 4. The other three indicators of anomia,
not included in Chart 4, show steeper rising tendencies during the 90s after a slight better-
ment had eventuated before in Western Germany (cf. Terwey 1997). In general, anomia
and intolerance or out-grouping may be expected to correlate. Our expectation reformu-
lated is: Anomia is positively correlated with ethnocentrism.
% NO CHILDREN and negative assessments of German economy
80 82 84 86 88 90 91 92 94 96
0
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CHART 4: ’Birth of children is hardly fair with this future’
and negative assessments of the German economy in general
West: NO CHILDREN East: NO CHILDREN
West: Negative Economy East: Negative economy
East and West German respondents (ALLBUS 1982 - 1996)
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Table 2: Multiple Classification Analysis for economy assessment, anomia and
diffuse political support as predictors of ethnocentrism factor (ALLBUS 1996,
results weighted to adjust the Eastern oversample)
n
Unadjusted
deviation       eta
Adjusted for
independents
deviation       beta
Part of Germany
 1 Old Federal States  1984  -,06  -,04
 2 New Federal States 512  ,25   ,14
,13 ,07
WORSE SITUATION
 0 Have other opinion  362  -,15   ,05
 1 Have same opinion 2134 ,03 -,01
,06 ,02
NO CHILDREN
 0 Have other opinion 1423   -,21  -,15
 1 Have same opinion  1073  ,28   ,19
,24 ,17
CARELESS POLITICIANS
 0 Have other opinion 428  -,38  -,23
 1 Have same opinion 2068  ,08   ,05
,18 ,11
CARELESS MAJORITY
 0 Have other opinion  536  -,14   ,01
 1 Have same opinion  1960 ,04   ,00
,07 ,01
Satisfaction with German democracy
 1 It functions well   236  -,10  ,04
 2 Only little change  1660  -,09  -,05
 3 Don't know 77  ,44   ,32
 4 Much to change   463  ,24   ,08
 5 Completely to change  61  ,50   ,13
,17 ,08
German economic situation
 1 Very good   23   -,39  -,20
 2 Good 305   -,14  -,03
 3 So-so 1158   -,09  -,05
 4 Bad 833  ,10   ,04
 5 Very bad   177  ,41   ,21
,15 ,07
Personal economic situation
 1 Very good   56   -,62  -,44
 2 Good  1221  -,10  -,03
 3 So-so  965  ,09   ,02
 4 Bad 190  ,24   ,10
 5 Very bad 64  ,49   ,24
,17 ,08
Multiple R  =  ,322
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The MCA-model in Table 2 shows the bivariate correlations and multivariate adjusted ef-
fects while the basic East-West-split is included again. Each of the four anomia items dis-
closes higher average ethnocentrism in the group of assenters. A systematic difference is
especially found for political alienated ones (CARELESS POLITICIANS; eta=.18,
beta=.11) and existential pessimists (NO CHILDREN; eta=.24, beta=.17). The notions of a
CARELESS MAJORITY and of a WORSE SITUATION for common people appear to be
more unsystematic in this respect. However, our expectations about anomia as a back-
ground for ethnocentric out-grouping receive some support.
Satisfaction with the democratic system is also closely related to the expansion of anomia.
If we do a factor analysis with the four anomia items in ALLBUS, one single common
factor results and the indicator CARELESS POLITICIANS turns out with the strongest
loading. Still we should introduce another indicator which has less specific connotations
about an assumed misconduct of politicians. Judging the overall performance of a democ-
racy is often considered to be an expression of deeply rooted, diffuse political support
(Easton 1979; Terwey 1996). A lack of diffuse political support could also be considered
to be a supplemental indicator for social disintegration. In fact, those respondents who ask
for a change of our democratic system are rather often more ethnocentric than the posi-
tively supporting citizens (eta=.17, beta=.08).
Following Durkheim (1951), subjective economic dissatisfaction and greed are basically
linked with social anomie or subjective anomia and it has been pointed out that ethnocen-
trism and racism have some kind of individual economic background (cf. amongst others
Krauth and Porst 1984; Küchler 1994; Steußloff 1997). To some surprise, results in Table
2 show that subjective assessments of economy have noticeable, but not very strong im-
pacts. Positive perceptions of the general and personal situation are both at least moder-
ately associated with more tolerance (eta=.15 or .17). In our first MCA, the measurement
of social inequality by structural milieus was closer related to the varying acceptance of
foreigners (cf. eta=.29 in Table 1).
'Postmaterialism': Shifting political preferences
The work of diverse authors on the shift from 'materialist' to 'postmaterialist' preferences
has attracted a worldwide attention. A common context of anomia and such value change
was proposed by Friedrichs (1997). Postmaterialist aspirations, which seemed to be safe
and sound, but presently fail to meet reality, may be one of the causes for dwindling self-
security and growing anomia.
Even though the thesis of flourishing postmaterialism has stimulated the analysis of con-
temporary societies, it has often been criticized. The author of this article claims almost no
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personal interest in the battered issue whether the measurements of postmaterialism are
restricted to mere attitudes or reach deeper to the 'real personal values'. The simple index
introduced by Inglehart (1971) can provide – at the very least – an interesting onset for
describing political priorities which are in a broader sense to be understood as strains be-
tween 'postmodern' worldviews, even though many of Maslow's ideas remain distant to
much of the research since Inglehart (1971).10
In the simple index of Inglehart, postmaterialists are those for whom 'influence on gov-
ernmental decisions' and 'free expression of opinions' have priority over 'law and order' and
'fighting rising prices'. ALLBUS-data confirm assumptions that West German postmateri-
alism still increased after a striking period of prosperity (Wirtschaftswunder). The eco-
nomic recessions which occurred at the end of the sixties and the mid-seventies were
quickly overcome to a large extent. Even the pessimistic expectations of many people at
the beginning of the eighties were reduced after the new coalition of CDU/CSU and F.D.P.
took charge of politics in the economic sphere. However, the social expansion of postmate-
rialism did stop after the end of the 80s. As the economic burdens increased after German
unification, a noticeable re-decline was observed (Terwey 1995). Besides, the New Federal
States, which are still in a relatively disadvantageous economic situation, have shown con-
siderably lower levels of postmaterialism than the West.
As postmaterialists according to the simple Inglehart-Index have a strong interest in demo-
cratic participation, humanitarian considerations and personal freedom, they may also be
supposed to have a positive interest in an universal application of human rights. Therefore,
we expect: People who are described as postmaterialists have less tendency toward ethnic
segregation. Table 3 investigates the relation between ethnocentrism and postmaterialism
while some other political attitudes are additionally controlled.
                                                
10 According to Inglehart's interpretation of Maslow (1954) about a hierarchy of human goals, cohorts who
had experienced wars and economic scarcities in the phases preceding the 'economic miracles'
(Wirtschaftswunder) would ceteris paribus put relatively high priority on economic security and safety
needs. Postmaterialism – flourishing in cohorts who experienced high material affluence – aims at intellec-
tual needs, aesthetic pursuits, humanitarian considerations, and good opportunities for personal self-
expression. Amongst others, it is expected to replace most traditional religious orientations in a modern af-
fluent society. Only a part of these assumptions have been examined by empirical analyses.
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Table 3: Multiple Classification Analysis: Political preferences predicting ethnocentrism
factor (ALLBUS 1996, results weighted to adjust the Eastern oversample)
Adjusted for
Unadjusted independents
n deviation eta deviation beta
Part of Germany
1 Old Federal States 2213 -,06 -,05
2 New Federal States 591 ,22 ,18
,11 ,09
Inglehart-Index
1 Postmaterialists 648 -,61 -,36
2 PM-Mixed Type 815 -,07 -,06
3 Material.-Mixed Type 954 ,27 ,17
4 Materialists 387 ,50 ,32
,38 ,23
Left-right-selfplacement
  1 Left 57 -,32 -,21
  2 114 -,47 -,23
  3 316 -,41 -,23
  4 351 -,31 -,18
  5 774 -,03 -,05
  6 609 ,22 ,13
  7 303 ,17 ,08
  8 171 ,47 ,37
  9 50 ,53 ,41
10 Right 59 ,78 ,44
,30 ,18
Government spending for defense
1 Spend much more 44 1,01 ,60
2 Spend a little more 142 ,53 ,27
3 Keep it as it is 680 ,20 ,10
4 Spend less 1072 -,11 -,06
5 Spend much less 866 -,16 -,07
,23 ,12
Government spending for police
1 Spend much more 596 ,38 ,15
2 Spend a little more 1110 ,05 ,02
3 Keep it as it is 951 -,23 -,09
4 Spend less 125 -,44 -,19
5 Spend much less 23 -,65 -,31
,25 ,10
Government spending for pensions
1 Spend much more 371 ,41 ,25
2 Spend a little more 924 ,09 ,05
3 Keep it as it is 1379 -,15 -,09
4 Spend less 120 -,27 -,17
5 Spend much less 11 -,09 ,09
,20 ,12
Government spending for environment
1 Spend much more 603 -,31 -,20
2 Spend a little more 1005 -,03 ,01
3 Keep it as it is 1030 ,12 ,06
4 Spend less 153 ,58 ,34
5 Spend much less 13 ,59 ,10
,22 ,13
cont’d
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Table 3 (continued):
Adjusted for
Unadjusted independents
n deviation eta deviation beta
Government spending for culture and art
1 Spend much more 79 -,09 -,15
2 Spend a little more 368 -,18 -,14
3 Keep it as it is 1296 -,05 -,03
4 Spend less 787 ,06 ,05
5 Spend much less 275 ,36 ,25
,14 ,10
Multiple R  =  ,521
Indeed, postmaterialism reveals a remarkable effect (eta=.38, beta=.23), which is even
comparable to the effects of education and age, the strongest predictors introduced yet (cf.
Table 1). Another strong impact is shown for the left-right-scale, which serves as a general
medium for the expression of many political issue and conflict positions. Hence, we try to
isolate a left-right component which is probably also included in the Inglehart-Index, and
look at the multivariate results for both predictors: Ethnocentrism is also strongly related to
left-right-placement with eta=.30 and beta=.18. People who perceive themselves as be-
longing to the political right wing still tend to be more ethnocentric.
Our conclusion is in this respect that a general left self-orientation provides some people
with an important belief-system which fosters pro-immigrant sentiments. Additional sepa-
rate regressions for East and West Germany show that tolerance is significantly influenced
by this ideology in both areas.
Nevertheless, differences between postmaterialists and materialists are at least of compara-
ble relevance as left-right-ideology. It has to be admitted, of course, that the analysis of
postmaterialism will profit from the inclusion of further qualifying indicators. The Ingle-
hart-Index contrasts two indicators of preference for democratic influence and liberty with
one material issue (inflation) and one security issue (law and order). Priorities for ecology
or general culture are at least explicitly neglected in the simple Inglehart-Index. Table 3
shows in addition five indicators of further political preferences. People were asked,
whether they would like to increase the amounts of money spent by the government for
certain areas. These spending options can help to go a little beyond the somewhat incom-
plete index-measurement of far-reaching ideals presented to us under the headline 'post-
materialism'. Security issues are often connected with traditional political orientations
which are attributed to 'materialism'. According to some results in Table 3, the safety ori-
ented preferences to spend more money for defense and police are significantly connected
with higher ethnocentrism. The same tendency is disclosed for the people asking more
money to be spent on old-age pensions. On the other hand, postmaterialist options for more
investment in conservation of environment and culture or art are corresponding with higher
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acceptance of foreigners. Thus the findings for the simple Inglehart-Index in Table 3 are
supported and extended in further details. Ethnic tolerance has some significant correla-
tions with so-called postmaterialistic or non-materialistic priorities.
Reported contacts with foreigners and religious tolerance
Besides the four 'guest worker'-items introduced already for the measurement of ethnocen-
trism, there are four additional items in ALLBUS about personal contacts with foreigners
living in Germany (ALLBUS 1994/split 1 and 1996) or up to ALLBUS 1994 with guest
workers respectively. These questions deal with four different social spheres: FAMILY,
WORKING PLACE, NEIGHBORHOOD and FRIENDS (including acquaintances). We
shall now investigate these contacts as potential sources for the acceptance of auslander. It
is often expected by open-minded scientists and cosmopolitans that the more inter-ethnic
contacts are reported, the less out-classing is involved. Mutual knowledge may diminish
negative prejudice (Rippl 1995), or people who are in favor of foreigners may be readier to
acknowledge even transient forms of company as personal contacts. It is to some extent
plausible that contacts often foster better understanding and acceptance: Familiarity breeds
consent. But putting this assumption to a test would not be as unimportant as it may appear
at first sight. Note the assumptions about tolerance increased by everyday contacts could
fail in practice. Such a reverse influence of probably involuntary contacts may be found in
many social settings.11 A finding that ‘familiarity breeds contempt’ would indicate some
pretty serious problem for future integration of minorities.
Overall, MCA-results in Table 4 show that people who reported personal contacts with
foreigners living in Germany tend to be less ethnocentric. Only a smaller part of the re-
spondents in ALLBUS may have drawn ethnocentric conclusions from these social experi-
ences or have remained intolerant. The strongest predictor among the four contact items is
the experience amongst personal friends or acquaintances (eta=.35, beta=.26). The multi-
variate effect of the East-West-split almost disappears. East Germans report much less per-
sonal communications with foreigners, and a larger part of their relative distance towards
auslander is statistically correlated with this.
                                                
11 ".. experimental studies have .. concluded that only when intergroup contact occurs under highly auspicious
circumstances should favorable attitude change be anticipated. ... In nonexperimental context, a major na-
tionwide survey ... found that the racial views of whites whose circle of friends included a black person
closely paralleled the views of whites with no black friends ..." (Sigelman and Welch 1993: 782).
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Table 4: Multiple Classification Analysis for contact items and religious teaching prefer-
ences as predictors of ethnocentrism factor (ALLBUS 1996, results weighted to
adjust the Eastern oversample)
Unadjusted
Adjusted for
independents
n deviation eta deviation beta
Part of Germany
1 Old Federal States 2507 -,06 ,01
2 New Federal States  654  ,21 -,05
,11 ,02
Contacts with foreigners: Family area
0 No contacts 2644  ,06 ,02
1 Yes, have contacts  517 -,33 -,10
,15 ,04
Contacts with foreigners: Working area
0 No contacts 1933  ,21 ,12
1 Yes, have contacts 1228 -,33 -,19
,26 ,15
Contacts with foreigners: Neighborhood
0 No contacts 2185  ,11 ,02
1 Yes, have contacts  976 -,25 -,04
 ,16 ,03
Contacts with foreigners: Friendship
0 No contacts 1791  ,31 ,23
1 Yes, have contacts 1370 -,40 -,30
 ,35 ,26
Preference for religious teachings
1 Islam lessons too  1042 -,32 -,24
2 Only Christian lessons 1015  ,37 ,29
3 No religious lessons 1104 -,03 -,04
 ,28 ,22
Multiple R  =  ,447
It has to be regrettably acknowledged that we could not yet include more indications of
substantive religious beliefs or attitudes in our investigation. But ALLBUS 1996 has at
least one additional indicator for the personal opinion about religious pluralism and toler-
ance. The respondents were asked whether they wish that Islam should be taught in Ger-
man schools as an alternative to Christian teachings. Two further options given in this item
are: no religious teaching at all or only Christian lessons.12 Noticeably, this predictor per-
forms rather well (eta=.28, beta=.22). An exclusive preference for Christian teaching is
correlated with latent ethnocentrism and thus this conventional option reveals some intol-
                                                
12 The demand for a general restriction of religious teaching is not necessarily an indicator for secularism in
general – tolerant secularists would neither mind the opportunity of Christian teachings, nor of Muslim
teaching in school. One could personally reject theistic belief, but accept the religious ethics as a valuable
choice.
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erance. Those secularization supporters who want no religious teaching at all deviate only
marginally from the Grand Mean towards slightly reduced ethnocentrism.
An expanded explanation of ethnocentrism
We have introduced some basic socio-demographic differentiations, social group affilia-
tions and a sequence of subjective articulations about the state our society is in or should
be in. The results from the separate MCA-tables shall now be tested in comprehensive
competition by regression analysis. In addition, extensions of this multi-faceted, but global
model will be briefly discussed afterwards.
Amongst socio-demographic predictors, age (beta=.16) and education (beta=-.13), remain
most important in Table 5. The difference between New and Old Federal States is now
overtaken completely by the explanatory power of other indicators in this regression. Fur-
thermore, the different levels of ethnocentrism found in various social milieus (cf. Table 1)
are reduced to a moderate effect for upper white collars (r=-.23, beta=-.03, p=.0779). The
size of the place in which respondents live is another structural distinction with signifi-
cance. Inhabitants of larger towns tend to be more tolerant (r=-.17, beta=-.06, p=.0003).
Again the thesis that familiarity breeds contempt is not supported. We have already noted
above that many large German cities have particularly high shares of foreigners.
All in all, a statement that socio-demographic differentiations have only moderate effects
on ethnocentrism (Küchler 1996: 260) is not confirmed for Germany by our analysis of
ALLBUS 1996. Further research will be needed to find out whether this divergence is
caused by using different indicators of ethnocentrism or by differently refined indicators of
socio-demographic characteristics in international data. We still have to admit that church
membership or church attendance seem to be no correlates of ethnocentrism as far as our
own analysis is concerned. If anything, right-winged Catholics are inclined towards ethno-
centrism, but this effect can be omitted in a parsimonious model without losing much in-
formation. Nevertheless, additional investigations will show an interesting variant of this
estimation in some respect (cf. below).
The general left-right-ideology is still indicatively attached with varying degrees of toler-
ance (r=.29, beta=.15). Even though its bivariate correlation is even stronger, postmateri-
alism (r=.37, beta=.10) seems to be surpassed at least a little by left-right in multivariate
model after controlling for education, age and spending options. These preferences for
governmental spending (defense, police, environment, old age pensions, culture and art)
remain in the extended multivariate model with the defense question being in slight lead
(r=-.21, beta=-.08, p=.0000). Overall the signs of the effects are in accordance with as-
sumptions about the positive correlation between postmaterialistic vs. materialistic prefer-
ences and level of ethnocentrism.
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Table 5: Multiple Regression Analysis with ethnocentrism factor as dependent variable;
(positive sign means estimation of higher ethnocentrism; ALLBUS 1996, results
weighted to adjust the Eastern oversample)
          r           b beta      t         p
Age ,38 ,010 ,16 9,109 ,0000
Education -,41 -,110 -,13 -6,584 ,0000
Social milieu: Upper white collar -,23 -,072 -,03 -1,764 ,0779
Size of town -,17 -,030 -,06 -3,629 ,0003
Left-Right-Selfplacement ,29 ,085 ,15 9,689 ,0000
Postmaterialism-Materialism ,37 ,102 ,10 6,088 ,0000
Spending preference: Less defense -,21 -,082 -,08 -4,910 ,0000
Spending preference: Less police -,24 -,042 -,04 -2,278 ,0228
Spending preference: Less old age pensions -,20 -,060 -,05 -2,991 ,0028
Spending preference: Less environmental protection ,21 ,063 ,06 3,507 ,0005
Spending preference: Less culture and art ,13 ,062 ,06 3,580 ,0003
Contacts: Friendship or acquaintance -,36 -,227 -,11 -6,472 ,0000
Contacts: Working area -,26 -,070 -,03 -2,069 ,0386
Contacts: Family area -,16 -,098 -,04 -2,375 ,0176
Contacts: Neighborhood area -,17 -,052 -,02 -1,506 ,1321
Religious lessons: Islam should be taught -,23 -,159 -,08 -4,344 ,0000
Religious lessons: Only Christian lessons ,25 ,146 ,07 3,885 ,0001
Assessment of personal economic situation ,13 ,052 ,04 2,464 ,0138
Assessment of German economic situation ,14 ,035 ,03 1,780 ,0752
Dissatisfaction with democracy ,16 ,071 ,07 4,261 ,0000
Anomia: CARELESS POLITICIANS ,16 ,123 ,05 2,960 ,0031
Anomia: NO CHILDREN ,23 ,159 ,08 4,810 ,0000
Constant -,906 -5,434 ,0000
R = .63 R2 = .40
Another strong reason for an improved acceptance of foreigners is perceived personal
friendship and acquaintance (r=-.36, beta=-.11). Contacts at work and in the family prove
to be a little less important, while contacts in the neighborhood could even be discarded
from this model (r=-.17, beta=-.02, p=.1321). If we eliminated the contact items from the
regression in Table 5, R would only drop from .63 to .62. Therefore, we may conclude that
these indicators are not indispensable to reach a high multiple correlation.
Still significant is religious tolerance proposed for lessons in schools. Judged by strictly
numerical criteria, approved teaching of Islam would be the predictor of fifth statistical
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importance in building a complex model via stepwise regression, surpassed only by educa-
tion, age, left-right and personal friendship. In the complex regression (Table 5) it still per-
forms pretty well (r=-.23, beta=-.08, p=.0000). A contrasting supplement is the restrictive
demand for exclusive Christian lessons which is still in positive correlation with higher
ethnocentrism (r=.25, beta=.07, p=.0001).
Finally, we turn to the remaining indicators of economic dissatisfaction, political support
and anomia. To some surprise the subjective assessments of economy still do not perform
very well – with the opinions of the personal situation performing perhaps slightly better
(r=.13, beta=.04, p=.0138) than those of German economy in general (r=.14, beta=.03,
p=.0752). These economic interpretations are correlating at least moderately with discon-
tents expressed about the democratic system (r=.24 and r=.23). Political dissatisfaction as
a measurement of lacking diffuse political support remains a relevant correlate of ethno-
centrism in Table 5 (r=.16, beta=.07, p=.0000). Out of the four anomia items two have
been retained in extended multivariate regression: CARELESS POLITICIANS and NO
CHILDREN. The general anxiety about the future of our children is still more important
(r=.23, beta=.08, p=.0000) than the criticism of politicians (r=.16, beta=.05, p=.0000). A
connection between ethnocentrism and NO CHILDREN could even remind us of the lam-
entable catchphrase 'Das Boot ist voll!' (the boat is crowded) demanding more restriction
on further immigration and on increase in population.
We shall finally turn to other economic assessments which we have not included in Table
5, either because of their irrelevance for our investigation or because of their close sub-
stantial relation with the dependent variable. Expectations about the future of the national
and personal economy were also tested (cf. V115, V116 in ALLBUS 1996), but these
proved to be almost irrelevant in our context. This finding is corroborated by the moderate
influence which the economic expectation of a WORSE SITUATION for common people
has shown above. What counts straightaway are economic threats or costs directly as-
cribed to auslander or social envy (cf. also Durkheim 1951; Küchler 1994, 1996;
Steußloff 1997). Assumptions about foreigners taking away jobs, having bad influence on
the housing market or encumbering our social security system are pretty relevant (ALL-
BUS 1996: V73, V75, V77). These somehow ethnocentric ascriptions raise the variation
explained from 40% (cf. Table 5) to 52%. In a period marked by diffuse economic envies
and by the weakness of a positive vision or encouraging metaphysics, foreigners are likely
to be a target for more or less irrational blames growing out of real competition, vague
fears and personal disappointments.
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Discussion and extensions
In recent years, the climate of public opinion in Germany has changed notably. Some of
the modifications concern political support, the relative importance of so-called materialis-
tic values, economic fears and subjective social integration. Very often personal compe-
tence of politicians and other actors in our democracy are put into doubt, even though re-
cent stages in this development should not be overemphasized (cf. Parry 1976; Döring
1990, 1992; Terwey and Pollack 1997). Nevertheless, it is likely that during phases of
subjective dissatisfaction and disintegration certain social minorities (once again) will be-
come a target of negative attributions. Actually, German survey data show a new increase
of ethnic alienation. This tendency is yet not very strong, but it deserves close attention.
Moreover, intercultural religious tolerance may also be considered to be deficient. While in
the Old Federal States at least 40% of all respondents are in favor of teaching Islam in
schools, there are only 12% to be found in Eastern Germany.
Objective income differences, social milieus and subjective assessments of economical
situations may be considered as important sources of ethnocentrism, but the support we
found for these assumptions was only moderate – at least after extended multivariate con-
trols. However, if we put structural milieus and our two basic economic assessments into a
simpler regression equation, they explain 10% of the variation in ethnocentrism. An addi-
tional larger part of explanation is mediated in this context by educational attainment. Edu-
cation by itself explains just 5%, but adding education to the simpler regression including
social milieus and subjective economic assessments raises the explanatory power from
10% to 23%.
The effect of education on ethnocentrism is pretty salient, but it cannot be easily inter-
preted: Educated people could be less ethnocentric because they have better opportunities
to acquire an ethically positive view of our world (effects of 'Bildung', culture or erudi-
tion), but one should also keep in mind that higher education increases the possibility of
expressing socially accepted opinions (social desirability; cf. Krebs and Schuessler 1987).
Anyhow, survey-responses according to social desirability would not completely devaluate
our findings about the strong impacts of education, as long as respondents do not con-
sciously deceive.
Another explanation of the strong education-effect is that inter-ethnic competition in the
labor market is probably less relevant for Germans with higher credentials. Additionally,
the special contacts, which better-educated Germans use to have with foreigners, could
often happen in advantaged social settings shared by similarly educated foreigners. This
could lead to more favorable perceptions. We may conclude that at least some important
social circumstances of interaction have been controlled in our models (social milieu,
community size, age, factual contacts reported in different contexts). A large part of social
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class segmentation is partialled out before estimating the multivariate education effect in
Table 5. Hence, we feel confident to some extent that a potency of higher education to re-
duce ethnocentrism is confirmed. Enlightenment via education with its correlates of
adopting human rights is ascertained in this investigation.
Neither the ethnocentric traits of the Old Testament, nor the more benevolent compassion
of the New Testament have prevailed very much amongst the majority of church members
in unified Germany. Only minor differences appear between more or less conservative
Christians. This general finding is quite contrary to official declarations about the Chris-
tians' stewardship for the weak and the poor. It diverges from some public actions as the
'Kirchenasyl' for particular foreign families whose remigration is proposed by political
officials. In general, many contemporary mainstream Christians seem to be at least a little
half-hearted about people from abroad. Those dogmatics who have a preference for exclu-
sive Christian lessons in school show a clear tendency towards higher ethnocentrism.
A remarkable correlation between ethnocentrism and anomia was found for political al-
ienation or lack of efficacy, as measured by CARELESS POLITICIANS, and for an exis-
tential pessimism which is expressed in the assumption that it is better to have NO CHIL-
DREN any more. If we run separate regressions for East and West Germany the effects of
anomia prove to be even more important in the New Federal States. The breakdown of
socialist communities and the far-reaching transformation after socialism has enhanced
social disintegration. Noticing that NO CHILDREN is a rather significant attitudinal cor-
relate of ethnocentrism in East Germany, we may also recall that the basic pessimism
stated through this anomia-item has particularly increased in the New Federal States (cf.
Chart 4).
Another important information about church is also revealed by using such separate regres-
sions for the Old and New Federal States. Church attendants in the East are slightly less
ethnocentric than their more secularized counterparts. Furthermore, the very strong effect
of age on ethnocentrism is differentiated in separate regressions. (East: r=.27; West: r=.40).
Nevertheless, age is still one of the strongest predictors of ethnocentrism in the New Fed-
eral States (same variable used as listed in Table 5).
The details and determinants of these particular differences between both parts of Germany
remain to be described in future research. As McCutcheon (1998) has come to some simi-
lar conclusions, using different models and indicators of ethnocentrism, the dissimilarities
between the Eastern and Western Christians cannot be considered as simply spurious. They
will deserve closer inspection. At least amongst the strongly diminished community of
Eastern Christians tolerance seems to be fostered. Anyhow, ethnic adversities in larger
parts of the West German population could still turn out worse (e.g. amongst older Ger-
mans), if the traditional churches would completely disappear from the social scene.
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The notion of a basic worldview or 'Weltanschauung' designates a personal set of elemen-
tary, global interpretations concerning sense, potentials and the social sphere a person is
part of. In general, 'Weltanschauung' constitutes a somewhat metaphysical reduction of a
complex social reality, but it also adds some complexity, because it is always a changing
selection and supplement of the assumed 'objective truth’ (cf. the concept of 'supplément'
in French sociology). Subjective views about an appropriate level of material subsistence
influence priorities and identifications for some persons, while others would rather free
themselves from further striving for such external objects. It may be accepted as a standard
that some aspects in reality or very special identifications are preferred to establish a 'Welt-
anschauung', while others are neglected. As far as ethnocentric tendencies of viewing our
world or dealing with it are firmly anchored in certain social groups, or in important indi-
vidual characteristics, they have to be considered as consequential and integral parts of our
social reality.
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